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CULTURE AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
David Kavanamur and Bernard Esonu 
ABSTRACT 
Culture should be considered as a strategic issue in the management of strategic alli-
ances that involve companies from the West and developing countries and from the pub-
lic and private sector realm. In-depth interviews along the case study method with local 
and global alliance managers in Papua New Guinea reveals that culture has a direct 
bearing on alliance performance and therefore should not be relegated to backstage as 
being merely part of the remote macroenvironment. The research shows that exposure 
to, and training in, cross-cultural management skills enhances the alliance management 
process, public-private sector alliances present special challenges when there are wide 
culture gaps and institutional structure differences, culture has more impact on alliance 
implementation and performance than on strategy formulation, and cultural-fit between 
partners is easily realised where there are shared values. The few alliances that took 
culture seriously were the ones that survived while those that did not, failed. 
Keywords – Alliance management culture, cross-cultural alliances, cross-cultural man-
agement skills, culture, shared values, strategic alliance management, wantokism 
INTRODUCTION 
This article focuses on the influence that culture plays in the management of strategic 
alliances in the Papua New Guinea financial services sector based on five cases that the 
author has studied over a period of four years. The five alliance cases are the National 
Superannuation Fund and AON International alliance (NASFUND-AON), The Bou-
gainville Microfinance Scheme and Australian Volunteers International alliance 
(BMFS-AVI), the Smallholder Agriculture Credit Scheme and Coffee Industry Corpo-
ration alliance (SACS-CIC), the GoPNG’s Credit Guarantee Scheme and the former 
Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation (CGS-PNGBC) and the Small Business Guar-
antee Facility and Bank South Pacific (SBGF-BSP). 
 
The importance of the article lies in the fact that increasingly developing countries and 
their organizations – public or private - have to interface for development as well as for 
profit purposes with organizations external to their immediate environments. More often 
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than not, such interfacing processes are undertaken through some form of alliances. The 
article has relevance for alliance managers in the West who work for global companies 
that have been prompted by the process of globalization to build alliances with compa-
nies in the developing world. As alliance managers they have to learn to interface with 
their counterparts who operate in environments that are high culture-context and ensure 
that both partners derive synergistic benefits. In such environments culture becomes a 
strategic issue with a direct bearing on alliance performance. 
 
The article defines culture as the “collective programming of the mind which distin-
guishes the members of one group of people from another” (Hofstede, 1997: 5). It then 
highlights the characterizations of developing country cultures and their impact on the 
actual alliance management process, a function undertaken mainly by alliance managers 
or liaison coordinators. This exercise draws mainly from Hofstede’s (1997, 1980) value 
indexes of relevant developing countries. 
 
Although strategic intent is now becoming paramount in alliance management, culture 
heavily impacts alliance strategy implementation and thereby underscores the im-
portance of cultural-fit. Different cultural fit strategies are offered including synergy or 
cultural integration of the partners, complete domination by a single partner, selective 
domination of certain alliance spheres by each partner according to competence, and 
complete withdrawal from the alliance if cultures radically differ. 
 
Culture plays a pivotal role at the management level in developing countries and invari-
ably determines performance outcomes. This is because societies in developing coun-
tries have high culture-contexts. Culture therefore cannot be treated as a residual factor 
to be relegated to backstage as merely part of the remote macroenvironment, but should 
instead be accepted as an important organizational component. Organizational culture 
plays a crucial role in work organizations in developing countries like PNG because the 
organization environment is a high culture-context. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Hofstede’s (1997, 1980) and subsequent studies enhances this article’s understanding of 
organizational culture in developing countries. Table I depicts the value indexes of rele-
vant developing countries with similar context to PNG. 
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Source: Hofstede (1997: 26, 53, 84,113,166). 
As shown in Table I, the power distance indexes of developing countries are consistent-
ly higher than Western countries (Table II), both by individual country standard and by 
the average of the two groups of countries. Discussions on management in Africa, Thai-
land, Vietnam and Mexico, among others (see Kavanamur, 2003), demonstrate that 
Hofstede’s indices confirm that non-Western societies accept that: 
 
 power is unevenly distributed 
 collectivism is preferred over individualism showing that human ties are much 
tighter relative to those in Western countries 
 masculinity is lower relative to the West reflecting a generally lukewarm em-
phasis on performance and achievement oriented behavior 
 there is slightly higher uncertainty avoidance reflecting an inability to accept 
higher risk 
 
Hofstede’s data on masculinity, uncertainty and long-term orientation should, however, 
be interpreted with caution as they are inclusive. For example, the difference between 
Western and Chinese cultures on masculinity is not significant enough due to rapid in-
dustrialization (Leung, 2000: 113) and the Nordic countries tend to be more feminine 
than Anglo-Saxon countries. Also, while Chinese cultures may reflect a higher average 
score on long-term orientation compared to the West, it does not necessarily follow that 
all developing countries have a tendency for long-term orientation. These findings gen-
erally find support in the work of others in international management, particularly Pun-
nett’s (1989) cluster analysis, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) value orientation 
model, Hall’s (1976) high versus low context culture framework, and Gannon’s (1984) 
metaphors. 
 
Although Hofstede’s study is useful generally for the purposes of this article, it must be 
acknowledged that his findings may reflect only a snapshot of evolving cultures and 
because it was undertaken in 1980, it faces the danger of being dated. 
 
Hess (2001) discusses the implications of aspects of PNG’s national culture at the or-
ganizational level. PNG is a nation of enormous ethnic diversity with over 800 lan-
guages and cultures. The bulk of the population (87 per cent) dwells in the rural areas, 
working in the subsistence economy. Social concepts which are common and have im-
plications for organizations include wantok. The concept is defined as a system of rela-
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tionships (or set of obligations) between individuals, characterized by some or all of the 
following: common language (wantok = one talk), common kinship group, common 
geographical area of origin, common social associations, common belief based on the 
principle of mutual reciprocity (Mannan, 1978: 200). At best the wantok system is suit-
able for the more clannish social environment (Hess, 2001) and has been referred to as a 
form of micro social capital (de Renzio et al., 1999). 
 
Hess (2001) observes that wantokism influences work attitudes in modern work organi-
zations. On the one hand, its positive aspect may be that it provides “mutual support and 
cooperation within mutually acceptable rules of social and economic behavior” (Wara-
kai, 1989: 45; cited in Hess, 2001: 14). On the other hand, because of its social obliga-
tions to render time and resources to unemployed relatives, it acts as a major disincen-
tive to work (Monsell-Davis, 1993: 8) and therefore productivity. It has also been 
viewed as operating within organizations with “detrimental impacts on decision making, 
control and communication” (Hess, 2001: 15). Hess interviewed PNG informants who 
were among 200 students in management courses at the Australian National University 
and found that the tendency to favour wantoks in appointments and promotions and the 
strength of informal work groups based on regionalism limit effective managerial con-
trol. 
 
Clearly, wantokism as a cultural orientation limits the motivation to work, inhibits or-
ganizational commitment, prevents recruitment on the basis of organization objectives 
or performance, impairs rational decision making processes and problem solving capa-
bilities, and is inimical to being proactive and to long-term planning for development, 
investment or saving. Kavanamur (2001) notes that PNG culture is generally less indi-
vidualistic, has high uncertainty avoidance, high on associative thinking with less ab-
stractive thinking, has a past-present oriented time perspective and has a pas-
sive/reactive task orientation.  
 
These are typical cultural orientations of developing country cultures (Kanungo et al., 
1990; Hofstede, 1997; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1997), which alliance managers in 
PNG have to be aware of and tailor human resource management policies, managerial 
practices, and interpersonal communications accordingly to generate appropriate alli-
ance cultures. Managers need to understand the society’s attitude towards human nature 
and towards work. 
BACKGROUND TO THE ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CASES 
Case 1 – Smallholder Agriculture Credit Scheme (SACS)1: The Smallholder Agri-
culture Credit Scheme (SACS) represents a strategic alliance between the Rural Devel-
opment Bank of PNG and the Coffee Industry Corporation (CIC). The alliance was es-
tablished in 1996 based on a proposal from the CIC. Although the SACS has other 
commodity partners, they are not covered in this paper due to space and time limita-
tions. The RDB-CIC alliance represents 28 per cent of the SACS loan portfolio which is 
by far the largest when compared with other commodity bodies. RDB’s alliance manag-
er observed that despite a downward trend in coffee prices the coffee sub-sector re-
mained the leading sector and recorded the highest loan collections cumulatively, con-
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The alliance is essentially a revolving fund constituting K10 million in seed capital from 
the GoPNG via the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL) for lending to 
smallholder coffee farmers. The revolving finance entails that the principal of loan out-
laid is reinstated for further on-lending upon repayment, with the RDB retaining the 
interest portion to cover its administration costs. The maximum loan for any one project 
is K10, 000 with interest charged at a subsidized rate of 5 per cent. Maximum loan term 
is 10 years with a 3-year grace period. 
 
Case 2 – GoPNG’s Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS)2: The GoPNG’s Credit Guaran-
tee Scheme (CGS) was established in 1976 and operated under the auspices of the De-
partment of Treasury until 2002 when it was suspended. The CGS was designed to op-
erate with strategic partners or Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs) under an 
MOA. In this case, one such partner which is the focus of this report was the Papua 
New Guinea Banking Corporation (PNGBC), a nationally owned bank that was merged 
with Bank South Pacific (BSP), a private sector bank, in early 2002 at the time of re-
search. 
 
The modus operandi of the CGS alliance stems from Section 37 of the Public Finances 
(Management) Act 1995, which permits the Treasury Minister to guarantee the repay-
ment of a loan, including interest, made to any person or business organization operat-
ing in a strategic area approved by the GoPNG. In this case, the CGS guaranteed up to 
80 per cent of loans aimed at cultivating a cadre of national entrepreneurs tied to the 
national interest of the GoPNG. Thus the PNGBC agreed to participate in the alliance 
through a MOA by providing loan facilities to national entrepreneurs at market rates 
using normal prudential procedures. The GoPNG via Treasury undertook to guarantee 
80 per cent of the loans plus interest not recovered in the event of default. Under the 
MOA, loan applicants under the scheme could enter through PNGBC and Treasury, but 
ultimate approval was the prerogative of the PNGBC. Upon satisfactory assessments of 
loan proposals, banks such as PNGBC proceeded to request the Department of Treasury 
to issue the necessary guarantees binding the GoPNG to pay the guarantee in the event 
of default before loans were disbursed. 
 
The range of loan facilities made available included individual loans up to K50, 000 and 
group, company and/or joint venture loans of between K50, 000-200,000 per member. 
These were granted on the basis that there were at least five national shareholders. The 
loan repayment period was five years with monthly repayments. Borrower equity and 
security were not required under the scheme and loans were for any productive purpos-
es. In the first year of the loan, a two per cent loan premium fee was charged on the 
principal amount. This fee was for the extra risks that banks incurred. An establishment 
fee, which varied with each bank, was also charged. The interest rate charged was the 
commercial banks’ prime lending rate and interest was calculated on daily outstanding 
amounts, according to Treasury’s alliance manager. Applications were made to com-
mercial bank branches, which forwarded them to their respective head offices in Port 
Moresby. After screening, successful applications were then forwarded to Treasury for 
endorsement. 
 
The PNGBC was a major alliance partner in the GoPNG CGS network because it was a 
state-owned bank that was established in 1974, had a market share of 60 per cent, and 
had a wide branch network up until 2002 when the GoPNG sold 75 per cent of its con-
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trolling share to BSP. PNGBC was an ‘all-finance’ bank geared towards providing the 
population of PNG with adequate financial services and products. The bank had to re-
duce its network of branches and agencies in the last decade due to security problems 
and to increase its profitability, but by the turn of the century, PNGBC was to remain 
the single most successful financial institution in the country as far as the mobilizing of 
small savings was concerned. As at September 1999, the bank administered more than 
500,000 passbooks and transaction accounts, with an average deposit balance of less 
than K400. 
 
Case 3 – Small Business Guarantee Facility (SBGF)3: The Small Business Guarantee 
Facility (SBGF) represents a strategic alliance between the Small Business Develop-
ment Corporation (SBDC) and Bank South Pacific (BSP), which was operated between 
1996 and 1999. There were other partners in the SBGF network but for the purposes of 
this paper focus is restricted to the SBDC and BSP alliance. 
 
The SBGF was a financial alliance that started in 1996 with an initial funding of K1.6 
million by the GoPNG. The scheme had three types of bank guarantees: the Clean Loan 
Guarantee, Collateral Short Guarantee and Credit Risk Guarantee. Loan guarantees 
ranged from 50-100 per cent of the principal loan and eligible loan amounts ranged 
from K1, 000-K100, 000. Under an alliance agreement known as the SBGF Participat-
ing Agreement between the partners that was reached in 1996, SBDC was required to 
deposit K500, 000 in a term deposit with BSP at below market interest rates. The depos-
it acted as a guarantee for lending by BSP to target clients. 
 
Case 4 – Bougainville Microfinance Scheme (BMFS)4: The Bougainville Micro-
finance Scheme (BMFS) represents a strategic alliance between AusAID, its Australian 
managing contractor (AMC) the Australian Volunteers International (AVI), and the 
Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) through the Bougainville Division of 
Commerce. The alliance partners created a separate entity known as the Bougainville 
Haus Moni (BHM) as a way to achieve their main objective on Bougainville - financial 
intermediary to rebuild Bougainville after a 10-year war with the GoPNG. Essentially, 
AusAID is the main financial backer of the project alliance and capacity builder of the 
BHM via the AMC, while the Commerce Division was the main alliance initiator. The 
Commerce Division also provided finance for the project through counterpart funding. 
Australian Volunteers International, as the AMC, provides a team of advisers to BHM 
and visits Buka three times a year to supervise the implementation process. 
 
Case 5 – NASFUND-AON5: The final case study in this paper represents a strategic 
alliance between the National Superannuation Fund (NASFUND) of PNG, formerly the 
National Provident Fund (NPF), and AON Consultancy (PNG) Ltd, a global corporation 
specializing in employee benefits administration. The alliance agreement was finalized 
on May 2, 2001 through an Administration Services Agreement (ASA) initially for five 
years. The alliance agreement stated that NASFUND would outsource its backroom 
operations to AON Consulting. This process left NASFUND with the key functions of 
compliance and client servicing. 
 
NASFUND is a compulsory savings scheme for workers in the private sector estab-
lished in July 1981 by the National Provident Fund Act Chapter 377 of the revised 
Laws of Papua New Guinea. NASFUND is the second largest in the superannuation 
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industry which totals K1.2 billion (A$620 million). NASFUND is currently leading in 
best practice management for corporate governance after a period of mismanagement 
during 1998 –2000. During this period, the company turned in its worst financial per-
formance with a near financial collapse in 1998. Net asset value grew constantly from 
K100 million in 1991 to K284.451 million in 1997 then drastically fell by 40.6 per cent 
to K124.033 million in 1999. From period 1998 to 2000 the company recorded losses 
each year. Profitability was restored in 2001 after a new CEO was appointed in 1999 
and some changes were made to the board. 
 
Importantly, the turnaround in the company coincided with reforms in the superannua-
tion industry, namely the privatization of state-owned funds such as the old NPF. 
NASFUND was incorporated as a company under the Companies Act in 2002. This 
meant that political appointments of CEOs and board members could cease. The super-
annuation industry reforms also brought the NASFUND under the Banks & Financial 
Institutions Act, particularly its requirement of board members and senior executives 
meeting the ‘proper and fit person test’. The other relevant pieces of legislation that 
reigned in the management of NASFUND are the Superannuation Act 2000, Companies 
Act, Public Finance (Management) Act, and National Provident Fund (Financial Re-
construction) Act 2002. 
 
The alliance now manages the employee benefits of 65,000 contributing members from 
over 932 employers as at April 2003. According to NASFUND’s CEO the decision to 
outsource to a major global company has brought the company financial results beyond 
expectations, even though the alliance is still in its early days with the company declar-
ing profits since 2001. NASFUND’s primary goal is client service and was seeking to 
be the industry leader by 2003. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CASES 
Key themes and issues of management culture run across the cases (Table III). Most 
involve the challenges alliance face in developing a culture-fit between the partners’ 
organizations and with the dominant societal cultures. A common theme that emerges is 
that all alliance management processes were affected by the negative influence of 
PNG’s societal culture including corruption, political interference and Wantokism. The-
se influences interfere with decision making, are apparent in slow decision making at 
management board level, and reflect strong social culture rather than business culture, 
emerging loan default culture and bigmanship resulting in strong respect for hierarchy. 
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Table. III Cross-case summary – Alliance management culture 




 Change management program introduced by NASFUND in 2000 has improved 
management culture. 
 Strong service oriented culture with improvements at front desk service. 
 Strong corporate governance culture with emphasis on transparency through 
implementing firewalls against corruption and political interference. 
BMFS 
 
 Alliance culture influenced by AVI’s philosophy of building grassroots capaci-
ty, effective communication with stakeholders, sensitivity of local culture, local 
ownership of projects, and gender balance. 
 Growing professional work culture within BHM. 
 AMC concerned with inability of board to make fast decisions. 
 BHM concerned with AVI’s tendency to pressurize board in decision making 
reflecting differing cultural orientation. 
 AMC feels BHM’s alliance manager has an exaggerated sense of hierarchy 
being a former public servant. 
SACS 
 
 Strong community service oriented culture. 
 Culture largely shaped by Community Service Obligations. 
 Subsidized interest rates shaped by societal culture of dependence on GoPNG. 
 Partners aim to cultivate a new market-oriented culture to lending. 
CGS 
 
 Alliance fell victim to culture of reverence for hierarchy and red-tape. 
 Hierarchy and lack of seniority for Treasury’s alliance manager prevented lat-
eral communication. 
 Reward system did not promote alliance management skills. 
 Strategic-, operational-, cultural-fit gaps widened by the early 1990s. 
 Handout mentality promoted loan fungibility and moral hazard amongst bor-
rowers. 





 SBDC’s bureaucratic culture affected its interface with BSP. 
 Alliance’s lending culture shaped by BSP’s strict lending culture that SBDC 
was under pressure to justify its existence due to slow outreach. 
 Lending officers’ discretion was supervised by senior staff to cushion against 
wantokism. 
Source: Kavanamur (2003: 229). 
Alliance managers who devised strategies to filter these influences or blend the positive 
aspects of societal culture with organizational culture were able to improve alliance per-
formance. In the NASFUND-AON alliance, NASFUND, given its excellent alliance 
management skills, undertook a change management process that improved the organi-
zational culture prior to entering into its alliance with AON, a global company. During 
the course of alliance implementation firewalls were implemented for protection from 
political interference that often gave rise to corruption. Thus, whilst the negative influ-
ences of societal culture was filtered out, the partners developed a strong cultural-fit that 
revolved around a strong service-oriented culture, with improvements in front desk ser-
vice and strong corporate governance culture with an emphasis on transparency. The 
firewalls, built by NASFUND being the lead partner, entailed separation of board from 
management and the outsourcing of the following functions: Chairman of the Audit & 
Remuneration Committee to PW Coopers, Investment Fund Manager to Capital Bro-
kers/ANZ joint venture, Chief Accountant to Deloittes, external auditors to KPMG and 
Fund Controller to AON Consulting. 
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To remove political interference, NASFUND became a private company after being a 
government statutory body since its inception in the 1980s. Conflicts of interest were 
minimized by having board members declare any such conflicts at the beginning of 
meetings and to promote transparency, board minutes are published on the NASFUND 
website, www.nasfund.com.pg. This website also posts the employment terms and con-
ditions of staff, from CEO to desk officer. 
 
In the BMFS alliance, the strong community service orientation and grassroots culture 
of AVI seemed to have dominated the alliance. The partners used local societal struc-
tures such as clans and used the positive aspects of wantokism, such as sharing, to de-
velop local trust and derive a sense of ownership of the GMFIs that were multiplied at 
the local grassroots level. However, in terms of work culture and ethics, AVI continued 
to inculcate a professional work culture and networking skills at BHM. 
 
Likewise, at the SACS the alliance has developed a strong community service oriented 
culture. The main challenge for SACS now is to take this CSO culture forward and in-
tegrate it with a new market-oriented culture towards lending, brought about by pres-
sures exerted on the parent partners to achieve financial sustainability. 
 
In the weak cases, evidence abounds showing that the partners’ organizational cultures 
were at opposing poles. There were no efforts made to achieve cultural-fit. In the CGS 
and SBGF, the commercial banks’ cultures were different from the government agen-
cies’ cultures and were the main source of conflict. However, in one of the banks, the 
state-owned PNGBC, the banking culture succumbed to societal influences such as 
wantokism and political interference, resulting in a break down in the lending culture 
between 1996-2001. It is noted in this paper that in this situation the breakdown in lend-
ing culture rendered PNGBC’s superb lending technology irrelevant because such tech-
nologies could easily be manipulated. A final point is that the failure to achieve cultural-
fit is bound to prevent the achievement of strategic- and operational-fit. 
 
A common thread can therefore be observed across all cases, revealing that cultural-fit 
between partners could be reached where there are shared values. Thus, for the 
NASFUND-AON, BMFS and SACS, there were common goals that accelerated the 
process of building cultural-fit. However, organizations that are poles apart in terms of 
values are less likely to achieve cultural-fit. In this regard, public-private sector allianc-
es present special problems and cross-cultural alliances add further challenges to the 
work of alliance managers. Moreover, when one adds the pressures of societal culture 
on alliance management, the task of alliance managers looks even more challenging and 
unenviable in a developing country environment. 
DISCUSSION ON ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CULTURE 
From the strategic management approach alliance management in the West focuses on 
establishing cultural-fit between the partners’ organizational cultures and societal cul-
tures. It also recognizes that communication is essentially embedded in culture. Moreo-
ver, it recognizes the fact that because developing countries are a high-culture context, 
culture becomes a strategic issue with a direct bearing on performance. Generally, there-
fore developing countries are highly relationship-oriented. 
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The cross-case analysis confirms the importance of culture to the alliance management 
process. Even though it may be true that PNG has a relationship-oriented culture and a 
high culture-context that may be conducive to alliance management, these traits make it 
difficult for alliances to reach a cultural-fit between organizational cultures and societal 
cultures. All the cases were concerned with the negative influence that PNG’s societal 
culture places on process management. These influences comprise political interference 
leading to corruption, wantokism which prohibits discretion in decision making, slow 
decision making processes, a predominantly social culture rather than a business cul-
ture, widespread loan default culture, and ‘bigmanship’ which reveres hierarchy and 
respect. 
 
The cross-case analysis contributes empirical evidence to the alliance management liter-
ature confirming that a cultural-fit between partners could be reached where there are 
shared values. Based on the NASFUND-AON case, it demonstrates how the negative 
effects of societal culture could be filtered. It also points out that whilst cross-cultural 
exposure enhances the alliance management process, cross-cultural alliances themselves 
add one more challenge to the process in a country such as PNG where international 
exposure is limited amongst its people and where the adult literacy rate is far lower than 
most developing countries. Another point to emerge from the cross-case analysis is that 
when negative aspects of cultural traits such as wantokism predominate, technological 
sophistication becomes nonsensical. The case of the CGS attests to this point where the 
breakdown in lending culture made lending technology less effective in protecting the 
quality of loans. 
 
In addition to the above discussion, a number of key lessons can be gauged from this 
paper. These include: 
 
 Exposure to, and training in, cross-cultural management skills enhances the al-
liance management process. This allows partners to appreciate differences and 
to work on common interests, rather than to focus on faultfinding. The ability 
to focus on the big picture, while simultaneously tracking operational or pro-
cess issues, is an art alliance managers need to master. The strategic manage-
ment approach calls this process ‘perspective taking’. 
 Public-private sector strategic alliances present special challenges to alliance 
management because there are wide culture gaps and institutional structure 
differences. The CGS case demonstrates that even when such alliances were 
not achieving their goals after more than 10 years, alliance termination was 
constrained by institutional factors. Governments may argue for the continua-
tion of these alliances on the grounds of community service obligations. In 
such a scenario, the private sector partners frequently tend to tag along using 
the consolation argument that it is their moral obligation to do so. 
 Culture has more impact on alliance implementation and performance than on 
strategy formulation. Developing culture-fit between partners’ organizational 
cultures and societal cultures becomes a paramount task for alliance managers 
and senior executives. All cases have had to contend with the negative influ-
ence of PNG’s societal culture dominated by wantokism, seemingly slow deci-
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sion making at board level, and tolerance for corruption. Cases that devised 
strategies to filter these influences were able to improve alliance performance. 
 Cultural-fit between partners is easily realised where there are shared values. 
However, organizations with opposing values are less likely to blend. Thus 
public-private sector alliances present special problems. Cross-cultural alli-
ances provide additional challenges to the work of alliance managers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The article is based on research that confirms the significance of cultural elements such 
as wantokism and its influence on attitudes to work, time and decision making in strate-
gic alliance management. In fact, all cases were apprehensive about the negative influ-
ence of PNG’s socio-cultural environment on the alliance management process. 
 
Alliance managers highlighted the significance of cultural factors and its many aspects 
such as a widespread political interference in management issues, a general trend to-
wards endemic corruption, wantokism which prevents discretion in decision making as 
senior executive oversight is necessary, slow decision making at board level, a predom-
inance of social culture over business culture, emerging loan default culture and ‘big-
manship’ resulting in a strong respect for hierarchy. 
 
Alliances that involved a government agency partner were more susceptible to the direct 
influences of wantokism and political interference. The CGS illustrates this where loan 
applications not only entered through the bank counters, but also through two political 
entry points - at the PNGBC CEO level and at the National Executive Council or cabi-
net level. Usually, such loan applications were approved outside the normal prudential 
banking guidelines. It must be noted here that this practice was not isolated to the CGS, 
but was also prevalent throughout the lending culture of the bank as the PNGBC was, 
until 2002, a state-owned commercial bank. 
 
These cultural factors made the development of cultural-fit between partners that could 
not change the cultural mindsets of people within their own organizations, much more 
difficult. In cases where cultural mindsets were difficult to change, the end result – fail-
ure - of these alliances was never in doubt. The CGS is typical, in particular when the 
PNGBC lending officers and Treasury officials deliberately approved loans to improve 
their social standing in the community or to reward a wantok or clan as part of the ex-
change obligation process. This culture meant that, the sophisticated banking technolo-
gy that PNGBC possessed could not protect loan quality, rendering it nonsensical given 
the socio-cultural and political objectives that were being pursued by PNGBC loans 
officers and their CEOs, Treasury officials, and politicians. Indeed, PNGBC’s prudent 
lending culture deteriorated in the period from 1996 to 2001 (PNGBC Limited, 1999, 
2000). 
 
David Kavanamur, Foundation Professor of Management, Strategic Management Division, School 
of Business Administration, University of Papua New Guinea. E-mail: kavanamur@hotmail.com. 
Bernard Esonu, Lecturer, Strategic Management Division, School of Business Administration, Uni-
versity of Papua New Guinea. E-mail: be6@students.waikato.ac.nz. 
 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 2, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  125 IPMR
A few alliances such as NASFUND-AON were able to filter out the negative influences 
of PNG’s societal culture by building firewalls around their alliances through good cor-
porate governance principles and legal reform to their industry. However, for 
NASFUND, this strategy depended on a change management program adopted by sen-
ior executives and the direct backing of the country’s prime minister who was promot-
ing economic and public sector reform. 
NOTES
                                                 
1 This case analysis is based on data derived from in-depth interviews with alliance 
officials of both the Rural Development Bank and the Coffee Industry Corporation at 
varying times in 2002. Interviews were conducted with the RDB’s alliance manager, 
the Executive Manager (Lending) and economist (both based in Port Moresby), and 
the branch manager in Goroka. CIC’s alliance manager, who is the National Credit 
Manager, was interviewed at the CIC head office, Goroka. Secondary data sources 
helped triangulate the data. 
2 This case analysis is based on data derived from in-depth interviews with alliance 
officials of both the Department of Treasury and the former Papua New Guinea 
Banking Corporation (now Bank South Pacific) at varying dates in 2002. Interviews 
were conducted in Port Moresby with Treasury’s alliance coordinator, Assistant Sec-
retary Treasury within the Economic Policy Unit, Assistant Secretary General In-
vestment within the Commercial Investment Division, First Assistant Secretary CID, 
and Acting Assistant Secretary Domestic Debt Management together with the Senior 
Financial Analyst Debt Recovery for failed CGSs and investments. PNGBC’s former 
alliance manager who was the Executive Manager (Commercial Lending) was also 
interviewed. Secondary data sources helped triangulate the data. 
3 This case analysis is based on data derived from in-depth interviews in Port Moresby 
with alliance officials of both the Small Business Development Corporation and 
Bank South Pacific at varying dates in 2002. Interviews were conducted with 
SBDC’s new alliance manager who is now the organization’s Managing Director as 
well as SBDC’s Manager (Training). For BSP, interviews were conducted with its al-
liance manager who was the Manager of the Lending Centre tasked with overseeing 
the SBGF alliance from 1996 to 1999. This person is now the Head of Consumer 
Business with BSP. Secondary data sources were used to triangulate the data. 
4 This case analysis is based on data derived from in-depth interviews with alliance 
officials of both the Australian Volunteers International as AusAID’s Australian 
managing contractor of the Bougainville Microfinance Scheme and the Bougainville 
Haus Moni at varying dates in 2002. Interviews were conducted in Bougainville, Port 
Moresby and Balmain, Sydney (Australia) with AVI’s alliance manager who is the 
team leader of the AMC and BHM’s alliance manager who is currently BHM’s pro-
ject coordinator in Buka. Secondary data sources were used to triangulate the data. 
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5 This case analysis is based on data derived from in-depth interviews with alliance 
officials of both the National Suprannuation Fund and AON Consulting (PNG) Ltd at 
varying dates in 2002. All interviews were undertaken in Port Moresby. Interviews 
were conducted with NASFUND’s alliance manager who is currently the General 
Manager and with its Managing Director. As for AON, its alliance manager respon-
sible for the NASFUND portfolio was interviewed. Secondary data sources have be-
en utilised for data triangulation. 
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APPENDIX A: APPLICATION QUESTIONS 
1. How important is culture to strategic alliance management in a typical develop-
ing country setting? 
2. Do alliance managers in the West and developing countries face the same chal-
lenges in managing alliances? 
3.  Why is it important for alliance managers in developing countries to filter out 
certain influences of the general societal culture from negatively influencing an 
alliance’s organisational culture?  
4. Why do public-private sector alliances present particular challenges for alliance 
managers? 
5. What key lessons could be gleaned from the few success alliance cases from 
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